| Credit: | 6 |
|---|---|
| Status: | CSF - core English ET - elective F,FM and B - mandatory Masters - all Semester - summer |
| Course supervisors: | prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph.D. |
| Course homepage: | JEM185 |
| Literature: | X. Freixas and J. Rochet: Microeconomics of Banking, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997 (1st edition) or 2008 (2nd edition) - main textbook. R. Gibbons: Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992 - good treatment of signalling and other game theoretic issues. (If you do not like Gibbons, you may want to look at any of a number of other game theory textbooks or to many microeconomics textbooks which usually contain a section(s) on game theory). A few additional references for those who want more books to study: Jean Tirole: The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, 2006 Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont: Contract Theory, 2005 Bernard Salanie: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2005 Martin J. Osborne: An Introduction to Game Theory, 2003 Oliver Hart: Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, 1995 Mathias Dewatripont, Jean Tirole: The Prudential Regulation of Banks, 1994 J. Laffont and D. Martimort: The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2002 |
| Description: | This course uses asymmetric information approach of a modern microeconomics theory to explain the role of banks in the economy. The course provides description of the functions of banks and explains the needs for financial intermediation. The emphasize is on the structural weaknesses of the banking sector that may justify public interventions. The course deals with the optimal contracting between lender and borrower, the persistence of rationing in the credit market, the use of collateral and the solvency problems. |
