GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
| Principal investigator: | † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc. |
|---|---|
| Collaborators: |
Pavel Doležel doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D. Ing. Monika Hollmannová PhDr. Lenka Šťastná Ph.D. |
| Description: | The objective of the project is extension of analysis of voting behavior and models from the standpoint of possible strategic voting (sometimes associated with manipulation). By strategic voting we mean voters’ behavior promising maximization of expected individual or group utilities. By manipulation we mean such strategic behavior of one group that wants to influence some other voters to vote against their interests but for interests of manipulating group. As an innovation to existing approaches we want to introduce into the voting models categories of non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters and to study also information complexity of strategic voting. Game-theoretical and other operations research approaches (multi-criteria optimization) will be employed as a general framework of the models. There are two types of research output anticipated: theoretical models as contribution to rational voters’ theory, and empirical study of the new electoral history of the Czech Republic (1993-2010) and voting rules in European Union with an emphasis on elements of strategic voting. |
| Participation: | Research team will benefit from long term cooperation with other European academic institutions oriented on similar research topics: Institute of Socio-Economics of University of Hamburg (Prof. Manfred Holler), Institute of Industrial Organization of Wroclaw University of Technology (Prof. J.W. Mercik), University of Turku (Prof. Hannu Nurmi), and Department of Politic al Sciences of University of Leiden (Prof. Madeleine Hosli). |
| Work in grant: | THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH TOPICS ARE CONSIDERED: 1. Models of rational voter behavior and extensions a) Axioms of rational voters’ behavior. b) Voting systems (Condorcet, plurality, Borda, Dodgson, approval) and impossibility theorem c) Efficiency of voting procedures d) Models of rational voters’ behavior: game theoretical models and multi-criteria optimization models, properties e) Strategic voting and/or manipulation, non-existence of non-dictatorial and non-manipulative voting procedures f) Types of manipulation (classification) g) Manipulability of different voting procedures h) Information complexity of manipulation 2. Models with non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters a) Concepts of voter’s rationality b) Rational voter = second best outcomes? c) Semi-rational voter = sincere rational voter? d) Manipulative rationality e) Non-rational voter = random voting? 3. Models of voting in small groups and decentralized committee systems a) Strategic voting in small groups b) Expert panels and selection committees: evaluation of projects (alternatives) c) University decision making d) Public finance, strategic voting and financing of public good e) Voting in the EU decision making procedures f) Distribution of voting power and strategic voting in committees. 4. Empirical study a) New electoral history of the Czech Republic (1992-2010) b) Voting rules in the EU decision making RESEARCH SEMINARS 2009 Seminar 1/09 - February 16 František Turnovec: Efficiency of Fairness in Voting Systems Seminar 2/09 - March 2 Martin Gregor: The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control Seminar 3/09 – April 27 František Turnovec: Political Economy of Voting Behavior, Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting, basic concepts and methodology Seminar 4/09 - May 4 Pavel Doležel: On the Efficiency of Voting in the IC, IAC and GIAC models Seminar 5/09 - June 1 František Turnovec: How much of federation in the EU Seminar 6/09 - December 14 Pavel Doležel: Analysis of the 2009 European Parliament elections in the Czech Republic |
| Web link: | GACR 402/09/1066 |
| Finance: | 2009: 577 th. CZK 2010: 631 th. CZK 2011: 692 th. CZK |
| End date: | 2011 |
| Publications: | Apportionment in Proportional Electoral Systems Based on Integer Programming Book review - Pradeep Chhibber & Ken Kollman: The Formation of National Party Systems Civic initiatives in the context of legal uncertainty Contest for power in organizations Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature Estimating the Efficiency of Voting in Big Size Committees Fair Majorities in Proportional Voting Fair Voting Majorities in Proportional Representation Fair Voting Rules in Committees Mathematics of Politics, Economics Methodology in Political Science Modelling Local Civic Initiatives in CEEC Politika a ekonomie: Úvod do ekonomických analýz politiky Strict proportional power and fair voiting rules in committee The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control Transition of Votes for Consecutive Elections – Ecological Regression Modelling Turnovec F. (2009), Council, Commission and European Parliament in European Union Decision Making. Turnovec F. (2009), Efficiency of Fairness in Voting Systems Turnovec F. (2009), Fairness and Squareness: Fair Decision Making Rules in the EU Council? Turnovec F. (2009), Fairness and Squareness: Fair Decision Making Rules in the EU Council? Turnovec F. (2009), How much of Federalism in the European Union Turnovec F. (2009), How much of Federalism in the European Union? Turnovec F. (2011), Fair Voting Rules in Committees, Strict Proportional Power and Optimal Quota. Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination Two-dimensional Voting Bodies, the Case of European Parliament. Volební systémy pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR založené na matematickém programování |
| Conferences: | 6th biennial Czech Economic Society conference Amsterdam, 1.-3.7.2009, SING5 - 5th Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory Athens, 2.-5.4.2009, European Public Choice Society 2009 Conference Biannual conference of the Czech Economic Society, 27 Nov 2010 IIPF 2009: International Institute for Public Finance, Cape Town, RSA Ottawa 24.-26.6.2009, International Conference on Policy Modeling - ECOMOD2009 Voting, Power and Manipulation Voting, Power and Manipulation, joint workshop with Public Choice Research Center |
| Downloadable: | Project 2008 Research seminar 1/09 Research seminar 2/09 Research seminar 3/09 Research seminar 4/09 Research seminar 5/09 Research seminar 6/09 |
