Detail publikace

Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform

Autor: doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D.,
Typ: Články v recenzovaných časopisech
Rok: 2007
Číslo: 1
ISSN / ISBN: ISSN 1802-4696
Publikováno v: AUCO-Czech Economic Review
Místo vydání: Praha
Klíčová slova: fiscal policy; dynamic inconsistency; political economy; public deficit
JEL kódy: E61, E63, P16
Citace:
Granty: Výzkumný záměr IES (2005-2011) Integrace české ekonomiky do Evropské unie a její rozvoj
Abstrakt: The paper uses a dynamic inconsistency model known from monetary policy to assess three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal constitution in order to limit government’s incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing political support. The return to ever-balanced-budget rule, state-contingent rules, and the establishment of an independent Fiscal Policy Committee with power to set public deficit with the aim of stabilizing the economy are discussed from the constitutional perspective, analyzing different incentives that these proposals create for government and alternative means to enhance credibility of the arrangement.
Ke stažení: 2007-1_5 Gersl

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