Publication detail

Turnovec F. (2011), Fair Voting Rules in Committees, Strict Proportional Power and Optimal Quota.

Author(s): † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Type: Articles in refereed journals
Year: 2011
Number: 0
ISSN / ISBN: 0943-0180
Published in: Homo Oeconomicus
Publishing place: Accedo Verlag, Munich
Keywords: Simple weighted committee, fairness, optimal quota, strict proportional power, voting and power indices
JEL codes: C71, D72, H77
Suggested Citation: Turnovec F. (2011), Fair Voting Rules in Committees, Strict Proportional Power and Optimal Quota. Homo Oeconomics, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 463-480.
Grants: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting IES Research Framework Institutional task (2005-2011) Integration of the Czech economy into European union and its development
Abstract: In simple weighted committees with a finite number of members, fixed
weights and changing quota, there exist a finite number of different quota intervals
of stable power with the same sets of winning coalitions for all quotas from each of
them. If in a committee the sets of winning coalitions for different quotas are the
same, then the power indices based on pivots, swings, or minimal winning coalitions
are also the same for those quotas. If the fair distribution of voting weights is
defined, then the fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that
minimizes the distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power
(optimal quota). The problem of the optimal quota has an exact solution via the
finite number of quotas from different intervals of stable power.
Downloadable: Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 27. No. 4, pp. 463-480.

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