| Author(s): |
† prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
|
| Type: |
IES Working Papers |
| Year: |
2015 |
| Number: |
11 |
| ISSN / ISBN: |
|
| Published in: |
IES Working Papers 11/2015 |
| Publishing place: |
Prague |
| Keywords: |
Arrow’s theorem, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, manipulation, Pareto efficiency, strategic voting, strategic nomination |
| JEL codes: |
D71 |
| Suggested Citation: |
Turnovec F. (2015). “ Two Kinds of Voting Procedures Manipulability: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination” IES Working Paper 11/2015. IES FSV. Charles University. |
| Grants: |
GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
|
| Abstract: |
In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability. |
| Downloadable: |
wp_2015_11_turnovec
|
