Work detail

Centralized or Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods with Spillovers: Which to Choose and Under What Circumstances?

Author: Bc. Petr Tuchyňa
Year: 2005 - summer
Leaders: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
Consultants:
Work type: Bachelors
Language: English
Pages: 50
Awards and prizes: B.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an excellent state-final examination performance and for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis
Link:
Abstract: This paper revises the classic trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. It studies the performance of centralization under different tax systems and compares them with decentralization. It argues that a conflict of interest between citizens in different regions caused by shared costs is significantly suppressed or completely eliminated when district specific head-tax is introduced. The outcome then depends on the degree of spillovers, heterogeneity in tastes for public spending and the mechanisms in which the centralized legislature composed of locally elected representatives works.
Downloadable: Petr Tuchyňa
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