| Author: |
Bc. Martina Pěkná |
| Year: |
2007 - summer |
| Leaders: |
doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
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| Consultants: |
prof. Roman Horváth Ph.D.
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| Work type: |
Bachelors
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| Language: |
English |
| Pages: |
50 |
| Awards and prizes: |
B.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis. |
| Link: |
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| Abstract: |
The objective of this work is to explore two different types of anti-terrorist policies and examine their reaction to distinct types of terrorists' motivation. We distinguish two types of terrorists' motivation. Firstly, we suppose that an individual becomes a terrorist to reach any feasible political goal. Secondly, we assume that individual starts a career of terrorist to harm her opponents by decreasing their income. Regarding anti-terrorism policies we differentiate two types. First type is called “deterrence”. This policy is the main tool in fighting with modern terrorism. It is based on the decreasing the welfare of terrorists or by increasing the costs of performing terrorist attack. Contrariwise, second type of anti-terrorism policy consists in increasing the opportunity costs of terrorism by raising available economic opportunities or in decreasing the benefit of terrorism. This is called “positive policy”. We examine both policies by the cost-benefit analysis and by the static game theory. This work argues that even if the positive policy is able to create higher aggregate payoff than deterrence its final effect can be highly influenced by types of terrorist motivation. This fact makes this policy hardly applicable in practice.
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| Downloadable: |
Bachelor Thesis of Martina Pěkná
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