Separation of Powers in Budget Process
|Author:||Bc. Jakub Matějů|
|Year:||2007 - summer|
|Leaders:|| doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor Ph.D.
|Consultants:|| † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.
|Work type:|| Bachelors
|Awards and prizes:||B.A. with distinction from the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for an extraordinarily good bachelors diploma thesis.|
|Abstract:||Fiscal institutions have significant effect on the final shape of public budget. In this paper, we survey institutional effects of separation of powers in budget process. The separation is pronounced via additional institutional tools given to the legislature.We show that option to constrain the executive using these tools would result in (i) mitigated redistribution, (ii) mitigated lobbying, (iii) mitigated political rents, (iv) political cycles smoothing. More, the separation leads to some
nontrivial effects, contingent on other political variables, e.g. relative size of legislator's constituency and information asymmetry between the legislature and the executive.
|Downloadable:|| Bachelor Thesis of Jakub Matějů