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Journal Name	Transition Studies Review	
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Schedule	Received	14 December 2009
	Revised	
	Accepted	5 April 2010

Abstract	This paper investigates the relationship between economic and environmental performance with focus on firms in an emerging economy, the Czech Republic, and their CO ₂ emission reductions. We discuss whether the hypotheses tested for local pollutants that firms emit and firms' finances are relevant for CO ₂ emissions. We test the hypotheses on a sample of Czech firms included in the first phase of European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We observe that introduction of EU ETS did not encourage significant investments in CO ₂ emissions reduction. Importantly, the results show that the firms that did invest in CO ₂ reductions experienced a negative impact on their finance. We argue that this is explained by the drop in the price of allowances on the carbon market in 2006 which resulted in firms receiving less revenue from saved allowances than they had expected.	
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Keywords (separated by '-')	CO ₂ emissions reductions - Firms - Finance - European Union Emissions Trading Scheme - Czech Republic	
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JEL Classification (separated by '-')	Q5 - G3 - P3	
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Footnote Information		
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Journal: 11300
Article: 168



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2 **Impact of CO₂ Emissions Reductions on Firms' Finance**
3 **in an Emerging Economy: The Case of the Czech**
4 **Republic**

5 **Tomáš Brzobohatý · Petr Janský**

6 Received: 14 December 2009 / Accepted: 5 April 2010
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25 Introduction

26 In the last few years climate change has become one of the most discussed topics in
 27 our society. Politicians of many developed countries are committing to binding
 28 limits on emitted CO₂ to slow down the whole process. As a consequence,
 29 companies have to adjust to new rules of game in order to reach the emissions
 30 target. This adjustment is of interest to economists as many questions arise. How
 31 costly is the reductions of emissions? Does it not harm country's economy and
 32 competitiveness? Which industries and companies are affected most by the
 33 regulations? Why do companies not reduce their emissions voluntarily? Or do they?
 34 What is the impact of CO₂ reduction on their financial performance?

35 To answer the last question, we continue as follows. First, we briefly review
 36 recent literature on relation between companies' economic and environmental
 37 performance in "[Climate Change in Companies: Relationship between Financial
 38 and Environmental Performance](#)". We compare impacts of CO₂ and local pollutants
 39 and investigate how much they are related in "[Extension from Local Pollutants to
 40 CO₂ Emissions](#)". We also analyze decomposition of CO₂ reduction. "[Introduction
 41 of the Emission Allowances Market](#)" deals with the influence of the introduction of
 42 the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and ask to which extent the system with traded
 43 allowances generates additional revenues for companies that reduce their CO₂
 44 emission. "[Dataset: Czech Firms after Transition](#)" describes the dataset of Czech
 45 firms. In "[Empirical Models: From Environmental to Financial Performance and
 46 Back](#)" we describe four models that empirically test the hypotheses derived in the
 47 theoretical section, and we discuss the results. The last section concludes.

48 Climate Change in Companies: Relationship between Financial 49 and Environmental Performance

50 Since the 1990s economists have often questioned the popular perception that both
 51 economic growth and a cleaner environment cannot be reached at the same time.
 52 And indeed, there are good economic arguments why the investment in cleaner
 53 technology should be profitable. Higher level of waste is strongly correlated with
 54 high amount of raw materials, which is of course costly. So installing better
 55 technology leads not only to lower levels of pollution, but it also improves the
 56 utilization of materials and resources and thus increases the overall productivity and
 57 efficiency in the production process, as discussed by Schmidheiny (1992). Rooney
 58 (1993) showed that in early stages of pollution abatement, there is a great deal of
 59 'low hanging fruit' abatement which is caused by cheap material and structural
 60 changes that lead to high emissions reduction for low costs. If the company is in
 61 later stages of pollution abatement efforts, further reduction is increasingly difficult
 62 and thus costs of abatement per one unit of pollution are becoming more expensive
 63 because reduction requires substantial changes in production technologies, as shown
 64 by Frosch and Gallopoulos (1989).

65 Generally we distinguish between two approaches to investigate the relation
 66 between economic and environmental performance. The first asserts that

67 environmental performance influences economic performance and investigates the
 68 influence of the environmental measures that company has taken on its financial
 69 performance. There might be a lag of a few years as it takes time to renegotiate
 70 supply and waste disposal contracts as discussed, for example, by White et al.
 71 (1993).

72 The environmental incentive approach was tested by Hart and Ahuja (1996) who
 73 found that emissions reduction improves a company's return on sales and return on
 74 assets one and 2 years after the reduction took place. This research also confirmed
 75 the hypothesis of Rooney (1993) that reduction brings higher profits to high
 76 polluters in comparison with low polluters. Similarly, Feldman et al. (1996) found
 77 that improvement in both environmental performance and environmental manage-
 78 ment system decreases the environmental risks of the company, decreases costs of
 79 capital, and therefore increases stock price.

80 Rennings et al. (2003) evaluate the impact on the share value of the company.
 81 Contrary to Feldman et al. (1996), the authors focused not only on impacts of
 82 environmental performance but also on impacts of social performance. While better
 83 environmental performance leads to higher price of the shares, social performance
 84 does not. They include more variables as indicators of environmental performance
 85 contrary to some other authors who use only information about hazardous accidents
 86 from the US Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Earnhart and Lízal (2007) are probably
 87 the first to analyze these issues in a transition economy, specifically in the Czech
 88 Republic between 1996 and 1998. The authors revealed that pollution reduction
 89 leads to both lower revenues and lower costs, resulting in improved profitability.

90 The second, financial incentive approach investigates which companies are likely
 91 to invest in cleaner technologies and as a consequence reduce their emissions.
 92 Contrary to the previous approach, these analyses are quite rare in the literature. For
 93 example, Earnhart and Lízal (2002) analyzed the relation between environmental
 94 performance and ownership structure as well as financial performance in the Czech
 95 economy. They found a positive effect of state ownership on environmental
 96 performance, and that causality runs from financial performance to emissions.

97 Extension from Local Pollutants to CO₂ Emissions

98 In the past the economic literature focused on local pollutants like SO₂, CO, NO_x or
 99 waste. These pollutants have largely been regulated. Efforts to decrease these
 100 emissions have been highly successful, as the abatement costs have been relatively
 101 low and factories at least in developed countries have been forced to tackle these
 102 emissions. However, this paper focuses on CO₂ emissions data which have not often
 103 been the focus of analysis, for which we can see several reasons. First, regulators
 104 and public did not pay much attention to this issue until the problems of global
 105 warming became a broadly discussed topic. In addition, it has been observed, that
 106 the abatement costs of CO₂ are much higher. OECD (2007) confirms these
 107 expectations. Companies were asked whether they had decreased their environ-
 108 mental impact. More than 50% of companies experienced decrease in solid waste,
 109 but less than 20% of companies mentioned reducing global pollutants.



110 More research on companies' CO₂ performance was initiated with the
 111 introduction of the European Union European Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in
 112 2005. However, despite growing interest in CO₂ emissions reduction and the impact
 113 of the introduction of the EU ETS on it, there is still little literature evaluating
 114 relations between CO₂ reduction and economic performance at the firm level. We
 115 hypothesize whether the results for CO₂ vary significantly from the impact of local
 116 pollutants reduction or not. Companies can hardly expect that a decrease in CO₂
 117 emissions will lead to an increase in their revenues. So the only way they can benefit
 118 from CO₂ abatement may be a decrease in costs. In this section we decompose the
 119 CO₂ reduction into several effects and analyze whether any of them may result in a
 120 decrease in expenditures.

121 Liaskas et al. (2000) decomposed the changes of CO₂ emissions between four
 122 factors: output level, energy intensity, fuel mix, structural change. In the empirical
 123 section, they analyzed the effects of these factors on the change of CO₂ emissions in
 124 13 EU countries in the years 1973–1993. In most of the countries, the increase of
 125 industrial output had a negative effect on CO₂ emissions reduction, but it was
 126 outweighed by the change in the energy intensity and fuel mix. Ang and Pandiyan
 127 (1997) investigated factors that influenced changes of CO₂ intensity in manufac-
 128 turing industry in China, Taiwan and South Korea between 1980 and 1993. The
 129 results showed the major influence of energy intensity reduction, while other factors
 130 were far less significant. Other authors estimated the cheapest ways that would lead
 131 to future CO₂ reduction, such as Dean and Hoeller (1992).

132 The results of all the studies suggest that decrease in emissions intensity is
 133 mostly linked with a decrease in energy intensity. This outcome indicates that a
 134 decrease in emissions is caused by lower energy consumption and thus leads to
 135 decreases in costs. This outcome suggests that the main driver motivating
 136 companies to invest in CO₂ reduction are savings on energy bills. Another
 137 motivation that leads companies to invest in cleaner technologies is the goal to
 138 become the industry leader who sets the standards that the competitors must later
 139 adjust to. The last reason why companies should decrease the emissions is the
 140 avoidance of control inspections.

141 As for the financial incentive approach, the reasoning is the same for CO₂ as for
 142 local pollutants. Companies with sufficient amounts of cash generated in the form of
 143 accumulated profits can invest it in measures that lead to reductions in energy
 144 consumption. Such investment is very desirable for companies because it can save
 145 considerable amounts of money in future.

146 Introduction of the Emission Allowances Market

147 There is one new aspect that has influenced the relation between revenues, costs and
 148 environmental performance. The EU ETS was introduced in 2005 in order to
 149 decrease CO₂ emissions and to reach the target ratified in the Kyoto Protocol.

150 Out of the potential regulatory mechanisms, the European Union decided for a
 151 cap-and-trade grandfathering system, which does not generate any profits for
 152 governments but which is politically feasible: companies get their caps for free

153 according to their historical emissions.¹ Big polluters are concerned about their
 154 increasing costs and therefore oppose any kind of measures that would generate
 155 additional revenues for state budget and imply additional costs for them (Goulder
 156 and Parry 2008). However, not only is a division of allowances important, but the
 157 overall cap is crucial as well. Even grandfathering may harm companies
 158 significantly if the overall cap is too small as they have to invest a lot in abatement
 159 measures (Bovenberg et al. 2003).

160 This system may compensate incentives to abate CO₂ emissions that are quite
 161 rare in the business-as-usual scenario compared to local pollutants, as we described
 162 in the previous section. It rewards those who have decreased emissions in the given
 163 period and punishes those who have increased them. Each company receives a cap,
 164 i.e. certain amount of emissions that the company is allowed to emit. The advantage
 165 of the cap-and-trade system is its flexibility and efficiency. The reduction takes
 166 place in the companies, where it is the cheapest. The desired level of emissions will
 167 be reached in any case; it is determined just by the overall cap that the government
 168 sets. The necessary condition is that the penalty that the regulation authority sets for
 169 exceeding the cap is sufficiently above the marginal costs of abatement.

170 In reality, there are several problems that undermine the advantages of the cap-and-
 171 trade system. The main problem is the amount of allowances that are allocated. The
 172 government is on the one hand biased by lobbying companies that require the highest
 173 possible cap. On the other hand, certain emissions reduction should be reached and
 174 therefore the caps for companies must be stricter than in the business-as-usual case.
 175 Allowances were allocated according to the historical emissions, also benchmarking
 176 was taken in consideration, but as the production patterns of single companies vary
 177 significantly there was no possibility to reach the common standard for more firms
 178 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). The data on past emissions cannot be considered as
 179 entirely reliable and this lack of reliability could be one of the reasons for the
 180 overallocation. Sometimes the overallocation was done even intentionally by
 181 governments in order not to harm their industries. This bias was confirmed on the
 182 data from the year 2005 which show that all new member countries were in the net
 183 long position, i.e. they disposed overall abundance of allowances. Some countries did
 184 not ask for more allowances than they used, but the allocation within the states was
 185 biased towards non-electricity industrial sectors, which were mostly in the net long
 186 position (Kettner et al. 2007).

187 The overallocation reflected in the carbon market in April 2006 when the price of
 188 CO₂ allowance sharply dropped. At the beginning of the first phase of the EU ETS,
 189 until the end of April 2006, the system worked quite well, and traders with
 190 allowances generally expected that there would be a lack of allowances in the
 191 majority of member states. However when it was revealed in April 2006 that France

IFL01 ¹ There are two market-based instruments that are applied to reduce the emissions to lead to emissions
 IFL02 reduction: taxation and the cap-and-trade system. The cap-and-trade system is further divided into three
 IFL03 versions: auctioning, benchmarking and grandfathering. Auctioning has some similar features with
 IFL04 taxation, companies have to pay for allowances and the system generates revenues for government which
 IFL05 can be used, for example, to cut other taxes; in benchmarking the caps are derived from the emission-rate
 IFL06 standard in certain industry; and grandfathering is based on companies' previous performance.

192 and Belgium were unexpectedly long on the allowances, the price of the allowance
193 fell by more than 50%.

194 The volatility of the system had several negative impacts. Firstly, it undermined
195 the credibility of the EU ETS. The second impact of overallocation was the unfair
196 distribution of the costs and benefits.

197 If the marginal benefits of abatement remained stable, companies could well
198 calculate whether investments into CO₂ reduction would be profitable or not.
199 Revenues from sold redundant allowances would substitute additional revenues
200 stemming from better image in the case of local pollutants. However, this holds only
201 in the well functional carbon market. The situation in the first phase of the EU ETS
202 with high volatility implies high uncertainty and therefore companies are rather
203 reluctant to invest because the reward for emissions reduction is insecure.
204 Especially companies that invested into new technologies before the fall in price
205 were harmed. They expected much higher revenues for their emissions allowances
206 sold in the market. On the other hand, those that did not invest at all were the
207 winners, especially if they expected the overallocation. They could have used their
208 allocations when the price was low and buy the missing ones much more cheaply
209 after the price fall. These imperfections of the first phase of the EU ETS
210 significantly determined the payoffs of investment on CO₂ abatement that we test
211 empirically.

212 **Dataset: Czech Firms after Transition**

213 We focus on Czech companies included in the first phase of the ETS and analyze the
214 development of their emissions, financial indicators and relations between them. We
215 gather data on CO₂ emissions of each installation from the Czech Ministry of
216 Environment. Unfortunately, only data for 2004, 2005 and 2006 are reliable because
217 of technical problems at the Ministry. Data on financial performance come from the
218 Aspekt database. Unfortunately, the database is not complete and so we have data
219 for only 125 companies included in National Allocation Plan 1 (NAP 1). If more
220 data become available in the future, the research might be expanded to analyze
221 whether there is a selection bias in this present paper stemming from the size and
222 selectivity of the dataset. However, the database covers the majority of big polluters
223 and our dataset includes 48% of all companies that emit 71% of total emissions.

224 We analyze how the emissions intensity (emissions/revenues) changed between
225 years 2004/2005 and 2005/2006. Average emissions intensity reduction was 11%
226 between 2004 and 2005 and 12% between 2005 and 2006. However, it is important
227 to point out that total emissions increased by 3% between 2005 and 2006, so the
228 emissions reduction was not high enough to offset the economic growth. Also,
229 Czech owners (57%) slightly prevail over foreign. ISO 14001 is a certification for
230 companies with environmental management systems (20%). Companies participat-
231 ing in NAP1 were divided between 12 industries and so we followed this division.
232 Most companies are from the public power sector (27%) or business power sector
233 (33%). The only common feature of the companies in the second group is that they

234 own their own power or heat station. Other sectors are significantly less numerous,
235 maybe with the exceptions of chemicals (9%) and ceramics (8%).

236 We analyzed revenues (r), profits (p) and costs (c) of the companies. For the
237 purpose of the analysis we often use not the total values but ratios. In this way we
238 want to smooth away the size effect and focus rather on efficiency or productivity.
239 So we use the ratio revenues/assets (ra in the table) which indicate how efficiently
240 companies use their assets. We use ratios also for costs (costs/assets) (ca) and for
241 profits. Ratio profits/assets (pa) is well known in finance as the *return on assets*
242 ratio. It indicates the ability of the company to turn its assets into profits and is very
243 important in a company's valuation. We observe that, in the case of ratios,
244 differences between extreme values are much lower. In the case of the indicator of
245 environmental performance, i.e. emissions (e), we also avoid using total values. We
246 rather consider the ratio emissions/revenues (er) which describes emissions
247 intensity. Because of computational problems, we are restricted to a sample of
248 profitable companies. These companies are on average larger. From an environ-
249 mental point of view, these companies have not only higher total emissions but also
250 emissions intensity.

251 **Empirical Models: From Environmental to Financial Performance and Back**

252 We empirically investigate the relationship between environmental and financial
253 performance and start with the environmental to financial performance model in the
254 first three models. The fourth model investigates the other direction. We analyze the
255 impact of reduction/increase in emissions intensity on most relevant aspects of
256 financial performance of the company: its total revenues, total costs and profits.

257 We analyze data for 2004, 2005 and 2006, in the later 2 years the EU ETS was
258 running. Companies that reduced CO₂ emission could be rewarded by additional
259 revenues from the emissions allowances that they sold on the market. Therefore, the
260 effect of emissions/revenues ratio on revenues/assets could be negative. As for costs
261 we expect that companies with lower emissions invested in modern technologies.
262 These investments are particularly aimed at the reduction of energy consumption.
263 Lower energy consumption leads to lower operating costs. Lower emissions can
264 have both positive and negative impact on costs. We observe how decrease/increase
265 in emissions results in profitability in last models with dependent variable profits/
266 assets. However, this research will be done only on a limited dataset of 90
267 companies out of the original 125. It is due to the fact that as we use logarithm of
268 profits/assets, we can include only companies that have this ratio positive within all
269 3 years. We must be aware that the results are derived from the dataset of profitable
270 companies only and therefore cannot be applied to all companies.

271 We believe that also other factors may have a significant influence on the
272 revenues and costs of the companies than their CO₂ emissions and we include them
273 in the model as well. The owner of the company may originate from Czech Republic
274 or from abroad. We hypothesize that companies with foreign owners may tend to
275 have higher revenues/assets as the foreign investors pick out the companies that
276 derive benefit from their assets effectively. Another variable is the kind of



277 ownership. We consider three types: joint stock companies (a.s.), limited company
 278 (s.r.o.) and other kinds of ownership (mostly cooperations). We add other variable
 279 ISO, which equals 1 for the companies that are certified by the standard ISO 14001.
 280 Each industry has a specific utilization level of resources. Another important aspect
 281 is the industry where companies operate and we include the dummies for twelve
 282 industries. We also include the level of assets, which enables us to observe the effect
 283 of economies of scale. We add a dummy variable for years 2005 and 2006.

284 We use a logarithmic model that measures the elasticities of variables, i.e. what
 285 impact a change of emissions/revenues has on revenues/assets. We chose this
 286 dynamic version because it allows us to observe real reactions and make predictions
 287 about the future. As we have a panel dataset, we apply general least square model
 288 (GLS) and, on the basis of the results of Hausman's specification tests, we prefer the
 289 application of fixed effects models. Table 1 in the Appendix contains coefficients
 290 and p values for all four models and there is also a detailed discussion of the results
 291 below.

292 In the first model, the revenues/assets is a dependent variable.

$$\ln(R/A)_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \ln(E/R)_t + \beta_2 \times \text{nat}_t + \beta_3 \times \text{own}_t + \beta_4 \times \text{iso}_t + \beta_5 \times \text{ind} \\ + \beta_6 \times \ln A_t + \beta_7 \times \text{YEAR}_t + \ln \varepsilon_t$$

293 The assets are significant and the negative sign indicates that companies with
 294 higher values of assets have certain problems with turning them into revenues. The
 295 logarithm of emissions/revenues is significant and negative. A possible interpretation
 296 is that companies that decrease their emissions intensity may sell their
 297 abundant allowances on the carbon market and thus increase their revenues. The
 298 results for dummies are relatively unexpected with Czech-owned companies using
 299 their assets more effectively than foreign-owned companies. Companies with
 300 environmental management systems also turn their assets into revenues less
 301 effectively. As for industries, the outcome corresponds to our expectations. Heavy
 302 industries, such as public power, refineries and coke, have quite lower revenues/
 303 assets ratio, while business power, chemicals and paper have a relatively high one.

304 The second model with costs/assets as dependent variable shows a similar
 305 outcome to the first one due to the very high correlation between revenues and costs.
 306

$$\ln(C/A)_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \ln(E/R)_t + \beta_2 \times \text{nat}_t + \beta_3 \times \text{own}_t + \beta_4 \times \text{iso}_t + \beta_5 \times \text{ind} \\ + \beta_6 \times \ln A_t + \beta_7 \times \text{YEAR}_t + \ln \varepsilon_t$$

307 The outcome for assets has similar explanations, as in the case of revenues. The
 308 higher the values of assets, the more problems the companies have with their
 309 utilization. As for the costs/assets ratio, this key variable of our interest emissions/
 310 revenues is significant with a negative sign. It indicates that companies with lower
 311 emissions have higher costs. So the depreciation of investments probably
 312 overweighs the decrease in operating costs. Also results for dummies are very
 313 similar to Model 1. Companies with high ratio revenues/assets have also higher ratio
 314 costs/assets, so it indicates only that they have a quicker turnover of their assets.
 315 Model 1 was empirically tested as follows:
 316

317 Model 3 observes that with lower emissions, both revenues and costs rise. It
 318 further asks what increases more: revenues or costs?



Table 1 Results of empirical models

Model	1		2		3		4	
Dependent	<i>Lnra</i>		<i>lnca</i>		<i>lnpa</i>		<i>lner</i>	
	coef.	<i>p</i> value	coef.	<i>p</i> value	coef.	<i>p</i> value	coef.	<i>p</i> value
ISO	0.122	0.488	0.179	0.327				
Lner	-0.336	0.000	-0.330	0.000	0.007	0.758		
Lna	-0.334	0.000	-0.345	0.000	-0.006	0.815	-0.512	0.000
Year 2006	0.022	0.429	0.022	0.443	-0.073	0.058	-0.287	0.000
Year 2005	-0.033	0.209	-0.039	0.155	-0.105	0.007	-0.182	0.000
Lnpa							-0.144	0.000
As	-0.405	0.000	-0.413	0.000	-0.161	0.028	1.080	0.000
Oth	-0.585	0.020	-0.598	0.018	0.799	0.000	1.765	0.000
Cz	0.371	0.000	0.386	0.000	-0.544	0.000	-0.866	0.000
ISO	-0.317	0.001	-0.277	0.003	0.578	0.000	0.457	0.068
ind2	0.833	0.000	0.815	0.000	0.213	0.106	-3.140	0.000
ind3	-0.760	0.030	-0.787	0.025	-1.485	0.000	0.614	0.198
ind4	0.448	0.000	0.423	0.000	0.418	0.000	-1.822	0.000
ind5	-0.250	0.461	-0.280	0.411			-1.349	0.005
ind6	0.368	0.027	0.345	0.039	0.428	0.016	0.004	0.990
ind7	0.140	0.422	0.149	0.392	0.505	0.000	0.611	0.199
ind8	-0.618	0.014	-0.607	0.016	-0.380	0.289	-1.585	0.000
ind9	0.326	0.034	0.316	0.041	0.440	0.000	-1.699	0.000
ind10	0.473	0.000	0.465	0.000	1.212	0.000	-1.260	0.000
ind11	0.201	0.176	0.181	0.224	0.180	0.118	-2.332	0.001
ind12	0.570	0.028	0.561	0.031	0.028	0.880		
Cons	-0.172	0.048	-0.240	0.006				

ISO is a dummy for companies with ISO 14001 certification, *as* is a dummy for joint stock companies and *oth* is for other than that and limited liability companies, *cz* is a dummy for Czech-owned companies, year 2006 and year 2005 are year dummies. The benchmark for industries is a public power sector and the other industries follow: business power (ind2), refineries (ind3), chemicals (ind4), coal (ind5), metal and steel (ind6), cement (ind7), lime (ind8), glass (ind9), ceramics (ind10), paper (ind11), pulp (ind12)

lnra logarithm of revenues over assets, *lnca* costs over assets, *lnpa* profits over assets, *lner* emissions over revenues

$$\ln(P/A)_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \ln(E/R)_t + \beta_2 \times \text{nat}_t + \beta_3 \times \text{own}_t + \beta_4 \times \text{iso}_t + \beta_5 \times \text{ind} + \beta_6 \times \ln A_t + \beta_7 \times \text{YEAR}_t + \ln \varepsilon_t$$

320 The emissions/revenues coefficient is insignificant and therefore the impact of
 321 change in emissions on profits is not clear and we cannot assert whether increase in
 322 revenues or increase in costs prevails. Many dummy variables are significant and so
 323 we can interpret their sign. Both years 2005 and 2006 show lower profitability than
 324 year 2004, which is rather surprising with respect to the growing economy. Joint
 325 stock companies are less profitable than limited companies, which may be also quite
 326 a surprising finding. But companies with Czech owners tend to be significantly less

327 profitable than those owned by foreigners. Companies certified by ISO are more
 328 profitable. However, we must be aware of possible inverse causality: companies that
 329 are already profitable can afford environmental management.²

330 The fourth model investigates the inverse relation, how financial performance
 331 influences environmental performance.

$$\ln(E/R)_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \ln(P/A)_t + \beta_2 \times \text{nat}_t + \beta_3 \times \text{own}_t + \beta_4 \times \text{iso}_t + \beta_5 \times \text{ind}_t \\ + \beta_6 \times \ln A_t + \beta_7 \times \text{YEAR}_t + \ln \varepsilon_t$$

332 We hypothesize that companies that generate high profits have lots of cash which
 333 they can invest and thus increase the value of their assets. Part of the investments is
 334 invested into projects that decrease consumption of energy and thus decrease
 335 emissions. It means that higher profits should theoretically lead to lower emissions.
 336 And indeed, the ratio of profits/assets is significant with a negative sign. The more
 337 profitable a company is, the lower emissions intensity it has. It may confirm the
 338 original idea that profitable companies invest in emissions reduction, but we must be
 339 aware of pitfalls of causality. If the company is profitable in a given year, it has
 340 lower costs which may be a consequence of energy savings which came first. So the
 341 causality between profits and emissions remains unclear. Joint stock companies and
 342 companies with foreign owners tend to have a higher emissions/revenues ratio. As
 343 for assets, expected economies of scale took place, which is shown by a negative
 344 coefficient for logarithm of assets.
 345

346 Conclusion

347 We analyzed relations between firms' environmental and financial performance in both
 348 directions: how environmental performance influences financial results of the compa-
 349 nies, and how financial results affect companies' emissions. This paper is innovative as
 350 the existing literature mostly focuses on local pollutants and there is little research on the
 351 impact of CO₂ emissions reductions on companies' finance in emerging economies.

352 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was introduced to
 353 increase the incentive for firms to reduce CO₂ by rewarding those that invested in
 354 CO₂ abatement. The more a company reduces its emission, the more allowances it
 355 can sell on the market and the more revenues it gains. So after the introduction of
 356 the EU ETS, revenues should in theory rise as a consequence of CO₂ emissions
 357 reduction. However, as the EU ETS did not work perfectly in the first phase and
 358 suffered from high volatility, we challenge the idea of increased incentives for
 359 companies and assert that it may hold only in a perfect functional market.

2FL01 ² The immediate impact might be different from the longer-term effects. Therefore we also used models
 2FL02 with explanatory variables lagged 1 year. We do not present the detailed results here because of space
 2FL03 constraints. The results were mixed with all three variations indicating positive, i.e. non-negative,
 2FL04 significant impact of emissions on financial performance. We hypothesize that these counterintuitive
 2FL05 results might be caused by the short panel dataset, which is further shortened by the lagged variable, and
 2FL06 that is also why we decided to focus on the models without the lagged variable. These results might also
 2FL07 indicate that there are some other problems with the dataset and possibly with the four models discussed
 2FL08 here in detail. Alternatively, these interesting results also signal the potential of future research on long-
 2FL09 term impacts of emissions reduction on firms' finance.

360 In the empirical part of our paper, we tested the above-mentioned hypotheses on
 361 the dataset of Czech companies included in the National Allocation Plan of CO₂
 362 emissions allowances. We investigated how firms' emissions affect revenues, costs,
 363 and profits in a given year. We also controlled for other explanatory variables such
 364 as industry, ownership, environmental management system and size of their assets
 365 representing the economies of scale.

366 We found that the more CO₂ a company emitted, the lower revenues and costs it
 367 had. It suggests that company that decreased emissions could earn additional
 368 revenues on the carbon market. But at the same time, the company experiences an
 369 increase in costs because emissions reduction requires investments in change of the
 370 production process, mostly aimed at energy savings that are reflected in higher
 371 depreciation and thus higher costs. Investments in new technologies tend to decrease
 372 consumption of energy and thus decrease overall operating costs. But according to
 373 the results, the impact of higher depreciation prevails and companies with lower
 374 emissions tend to have higher costs. The impact of emissions reduction on firms'
 375 profits remains unclear; we cannot say whether revenues or costs increase more in
 376 consequence of lower emissions. We also investigated the inverse relation, how
 377 profitability influences companies' emissions. We found that more profitable
 378 companies tend to have lower emissions. When interpreting the results, we should
 379 be aware of the limited dataset and relatively short panel data.

380 We conclude that introduction of the first phase of the EU ETS did not encourage
 381 significant investments in CO₂ emissions reduction. The 3-year time horizon was
 382 too short for calculations of investment profitability, and uncertainty of develop-
 383 ment of the carbon market after 2007 did not enable a prediction of potential future
 384 revenues. Although the reduction of CO₂ emissions between 2004 and 2006 had a
 385 positive impact on companies' revenues, we cannot claim that the investments paid
 386 off. Firstly, companies with lower revenues experienced increases in costs resulting
 387 from high depreciations of costly investments. The higher costs offset the impact of
 388 higher revenues and profitability of such investments is thus unclear. In addition,
 389 our sample does not cover year 2007 when the additional revenues dropped due to
 390 the fall in carbon price to virtually zero. To conclude, the EU ETS did not introduce
 391 sufficient incentives that would reward companies abating CO₂. However, although
 392 these companies lost on their investments, they may be rewarded in later years as
 393 the European carbon regulation is expected to be stricter.

394 **Acknowledgments** The authors are grateful to Milan Ščasný and Jan Brůha for helpful comments on an
 395 earlier draft of this paper. We are also grateful to the Centre for the Environment of the Charles
 396 University in Prague for the access to the dataset. The authors acknowledge the support by the
 397 Institutional Research Framework 2005–2010, MSM0021620841 of Institute of Economic Studies,
 398 Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. The usual disclaimer applies.

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