Detail publikace

The Unnoticed Difference between Antitrust and Competition Policy

Autor: PhDr. Petra Luňáčková Ph.D.,
Typ: IES Working Papers
Rok: 2011
Číslo: 38
Publikováno v: IES Working Papers; December 2011
Místo vydání: Prague
Klíčová slova: competition policy, antitrust, non-price vertical restraints, National Competition Authority, game form
JEL kódy: L42, L44, C79, D79
Citace: Luňáčková, P. (2011). “The Unnoticed Difference between Antitrust and Competition Policy” IES Working Paper 37/2011. IES FSV. Charles University.
Abstrakt: This paper presents a model which focuses on differences between the competition policy of the EU and antitrust of the U.S. It introduces three versions – Neutral, American, and European. Two-stage game model takes the authority’s perspective and describes options and behavior of antitrust officials when a firm engages in non-price vertical agreement (possibly restraint). Optimal behavior is expressed as expected income of the authority (EIA) which is a function of probability of wrong decision(s) in the course of action. It takes into account specific preferences, different types of errors, fear of those errors, and harm they might cause. Comparison shows some unnoticed features and results slightly in favor of the EU.
Ke stažení: WP 2011_38_Lunackova


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