Detail publikace

Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Autor: † prof. RNDr. Ing. František Turnovec CSc.,
Typ: Kapitoly v knize
Rok: 2013
Číslo: 0
ISSN / ISBN: 978-3-642-35928-6
Publikováno v: Springer Verlag
Místo vydání: Berlin-Heidelberg
Klíčová slova: Simple weighted committee, fairness, optimal quota, strict proportional power, voting and power indices
JEL kódy: C71, D72, H77
Citace: Turnovec F., Fair Voting Rules in Committees. In: Holler M.J. and H. Nurmi (eds), Power, Voting and Voting Power, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg, pp. 347-364
Granty: GACR 402/09/1066: Political Economy of Voting Behavior: Rational Voter Theory and Models of Strategic Voting
Abstrakt: In simple weighted committees with a finite number of members, fixed weights, and changing quota there exist a finite number of different quota intervals of stable power with the same sets of winning coalitions for all quotas from each of them. If in a committee the sets of winning coalitions
for different quotas are the same, then the power indices based on pivots, swings, or minimal winning coalitions are also the same for those quotas. If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then the fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes
the distance between relative voting weights and relative voting power (optimal quota).
The problem of the optimal quota has an exact solution via the finite number of quotas from different intervals of stable power.
Ke stažení: reprint

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